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NOTE
WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN, MEET THE
WORLD WIDE WEB: AN EXAMINATION OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION APPLIED TO A
NEW WORLD
During the last fifteen years, public use of the Internet and
the World Wide Web2 has increased tremendously.3 Not surpris-
' The Internet can best be described as an intangible network of networks inter-
connecting millions of computers around the world. See Have You Been Surfing the
Internet Yet?, MGMT. SERVICES, July 1996, at 21, available in LEXIS, Busfin Li-
brary, ABI File. The forerunner of the Internet was created in the summer of 1969
by the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Project Agency. Id. The goal
was "to build a computer network that would enable researchers around the country
to share ideas." Barbara Kantrowitz & Adam Rogers, The Birth of the Internet,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1994, at 56. Originally termed the "ARPANET," this network
linked military computers, defense contractors, and universities. A Changeling's
Tale, THE ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at S7; see also Patricia Schnaidt, History of the
Future, NETWORK COMPUTING, Oct. 1, 1994, at P35 (noting that within one and one-
half years of its first connection, "the Internet had grown to link 10 research facili-
ties"). In 1990, ARPANET was replaced by the more technologically advanced
NSFNET. See APRIL MARINE ETAL., INTERNET: GETTING STARTED 5 (1993).
Today an estimated 40 million people have access to the Internet, and 60 per-
cent of of the host computers are located in the United States. See ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The government has speculated that the
number of users will grow to 200 million by the year 1999. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at
829; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). At least 75 countries have
full Internet access, and another 77 countries can send and receive e-mail. The In-
ternet Affects All Areas of Modern Life, ONLINE PRODUCT NEWS, May 1995, available
in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File. For a complete discussion of the origin
and functioning of the Internet and World Wide Web, see generally PETER H.
SALUS, CASTING THE NET (1995); Edwin Diamond & Stephen Bates, The Ancient
History of the Internet, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1995, at 34-35.2 The World Wide Web ("Web") "is currently the most advanced information sys-
tem deployed on the Internet." An Executive Summary of the World Wide Web Ini-
tiative (visited Mar. 5, 1997) <http:/www.w3.org/pub/WWW/summary.html>
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ingly, businesses have begun to exploit the Internet for commer-
cial purposes.4 Specifically, businesses are using the Internet to
communicate with consumers and other businesses throughout
the United States and the world.5 At the same time, the ever ex-
panding reach of the Internet has presented difficult new legal
questions, in particular, issues involving personal jurisdiction
over Internet users.6
[hereinafter Executive Summary]. It is a "global, seamless environment in which all
information ... that is accessible from the Internet can be accessed in a consistent
and simple way .... " Overview of the World Wide Web, (visited Mar. 5, 1997) <http'J/
www.cio.com/webmaster/sem2_web.html>. The information contained in these
documents, called "Web pages," can be stored in different formats such as text,
sound, graphics, or video. Id. Using software called a browser, a person "can access
many existing data systems via existing protocols[] or via http and a gateway." Ex-
ecutive Summary, supra. Each Web page has its own "address" indicating which
"server" computer the page is stored. See Thomas Mace, The Perfect Internet Con-
nection, PC MAG., July 1, 1996, at 196; Judith Hurwitz, Using Object Request Bro-
kers (ORBS) to Fortify Distributed Computing over the Internet, DBMS, July 1996,
at 12. Web pages often contain "links," which are highlighted sections of text or im-
ages, that refer to a related Web page. See Executive Summary, supra. When a per-
son viewing the Web page "clicks" on the link (or selects the link with a mouse), the
browser automatically contacts the server upon which the selected Web page is
stored and allows the user to view the linked Web page. Id.
The World Wide Web is the creation of a European think tank, Conseil Euro-
pean pour la Recherche Nucleaire ("CERN") made up of computer scientists, for the
purpose of facilitating the work of physics researchers. BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER,
PUBLISH IT ON THE WEB 32-33 (1996). The Web is just one "information service that
links documents across the internet .... " STEVE LAMBERT & WALT HOWE, INTERNET
BASICS (1993) 17.
3 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831 (stating that in 1981 there were roughly 300
computers connected to Internet and today there are over nine million); MTV Net-
works v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that Internet
audience is doubling each year).
4 See Dale M. Cendali & James D. Arbogast, 'Net Use Raises Issues of Jurisdic-
tion, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 1996, at C7, Cl (stating that "already brisk commerce
over the Internet is expected to increase exponentially as secure credit card trans-
actions and other forms of electronic payment are perfected"); Jill H. Ellsworth,
Staking a Claim on the Internet, NATION'S Bus., January 1, 1996, at 29 (stating that
"[b]usinesses are flocking to gain a presence on the World Wide Web, where small
firms are on equal footing with the big players"); Glyn Moody, Adapting Your Busi-
ness Needs to the Internet, COMPUTER WKLY., June 22, 1995, at 61 (stating that
"[today it is becoming more and more common to see commercial users in all parts
of the Internet"); What Are You Doing On the Web? (Reasons Business People Use
the World Wide Web), INC., June 1, 1996, at 124 (citing recent study indicating that
half of people in United States and Canada using World Wide Web do so for busi-
ness purposes).
5 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 844 (stating that Internet is "a unique and wholly
new medium of worldwide human communication").
6 See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268-69 (6th Cir. 1996)
(deciding jurisdiction was proper in service provider's state in action against sub-
scriber); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
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This Note analyzes the jurisdictional issues pertaining to the
Internet and examines the adequacy of applying existing per-
sonal jurisdiction doctrines to the use of the Internet. Part I
briefly introduces the traditional principles used in resolving
personal jurisdiction issues. Part II reviews several recent cases
involving personal jurisdiction and the Internet. In Part III, this
Note criticizes several of these cases for inconsistent application
of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Finally, Part IV explores
the reasons why due process requirements are not satisfied when
the sole contact a defendant has with a forum state is a Web
page.
I. TRADITIONAL TESTS FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION: THE
REQUIREMENT OF "MINIMUM CONTACTS"
The fundamental exercise of personal jurisdiction by a court
over a nonresident rests upon the long-arm statute of the state
in which the court sits.8 Even if the long-arm statute grants per-
(dismissing complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction in trademark infringement
case where only contact with state was defendant's Web page); Maritz, Inc. v. Cy-
bergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that jurisdiction was
proper in trademark infringement case where only contact was defendant's Web
page); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996)
(upholding jurisdiction where defendant's contacts consisted of repetitive solicita-
tions via Internet).
7 Each state enacts its own long-arm statute listing the types of cases which
confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who is not "present"
within the state. See Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 639 n.14 (1990)
(Brennan, J.,-concurring) (discussing Justice Scalia's opinion that states may ex-
pand reach of their personal jurisdiction to limits established by Federal Constitu-
tion by enacting long-arm statutes); Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484
U.S. 97, 105 (1987) (noting that under Rule 4(e) federal court must look "either to a
federal statute or to the long-arm statute of the State in which it sits to determine
whether a defendant is amenable to service, a prerequisite to its exercise of personal
jurisdiction"); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 713 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (indicating that state's long-arm statute
is "the applicable jurisdictional provision under the Rules of Decisions Act").
8 Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[ulnless other-
wise provided by federal law, service upon an individual ... may be effected ... (1)
pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is located ...." FED. R.
CIV. P. 4(e)(1). Similarly Rule 4(h) provides that "[uinless otherwise provided by
federal law, service upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership ...
shall be effected (1) in a judicial district ... in the manner prescribed for individuals
by subdivision (e)(1) ...."FED. R. CIv. P. 4(h)(1); see also Agency Rent A Car Sys.,
Inc. v. Grand Rent A Car Corp., 98 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that "[a] court
sitting in diversity applies the law of the forum state in determining whether it has
personal jurisdiction over the defendants"); Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd.,
94 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that federal district courts must look to fo-
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sonal jurisdiction over a defendant in a given case, the court
must still ascertain whether the assertion of such jurisdiction
comports with the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.9 The
Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth"° and Fourteenth"
Amendments protect an individual from binding judgments in a
foreign jurisdiction "with which he has ... no meaningful
'contacts, ties, or relations.' "' The historical requirement of a
physical presence 3 within a state to properly assert jurisdiction 4
rum state's long-arm statute in order to resolve issue of personal jurisdiction); Tri-
erweiler v. Croxton and Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1532 (10th Cir. 1996)
("In diversity cases, federal courts have in personam jurisdiction as permitted by
State law ....").
In some instances, a forum state may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
on the basis of the "bulge" exception. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(k)(1)(B). Specifically, this
exception provides that if a party does not have sufficient minimum contacts with
the forum state, but is within a 100 mile radius of the federal courthouse in which
the action was filed, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over that party.
Discussion of the "bulge" exception of Rule 4(k) is outside the scope of this Note.
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (noting that
states may exercise personal jurisdiction upon defendant only if that defendant had
established certain minimum contacts with forum state and such exercise did not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980) (citation omitted) ("The
Due Process Clause 'does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judg-
ment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the
State has no contacts, ties, or relations.' "); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203
(1977) ("[Dlue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not of-
fend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' "); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940).
o The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
" The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
"Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citing Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)); see also World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291 ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a
nonresident defendant.").
13 "A] defendant in a civil suit can be subjected to [a state's] jurisdiction in per-
sonam only by service within the district." Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324
U.S. 439, 468 (1945) (citing Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 330 (1838)).
The defendant need not be physically present within the state for personal jurisdic-
tion "[slo long as a commercial actor's efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward resi-
dents of another state ...." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; "[u]nder the general provi-
sions of law, a United States district court cannot issue process beyond the limits of
the district." Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. at 467-68 (citing Harkness v. Hyde, 98
[Vol. 71:403
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was modified by International Shoe Co. v. Washington5 and its
progeny. Under current personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, a
person may be deemed "present" within a forum state in satis-
faction of the Due Process Clause, if that person has certain
"minimum contacts" 6 with the forum state, "such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'"'
The determination of whether minimum contacts are suffi-
cient to satisfy due process depends "upon the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration
of the laws."8 The resolution of this question requires a court to
examine whether the defendant "purposefully avail[ed] itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws," 9 such
that it could reasonably anticipate being haled into the forum
U.S. 476, 478 (1878)). The term "virtual presence" has been used to describe the
situation where Internet contacts are examined as the basis of jurisdiction. See
Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the
Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339, 350 (1996).
" See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (1945); see also World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291 (stating that "[a] judgment rendered in violation of due
process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit
elsewhere").
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"The "minimum contacts" requirement has been said to serve two related
functions: protecting "the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum" and ensuring that the states "do not reach out beyond the lim-
its imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns ...." World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92.
17 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)). The "fair play and substantial justice" standard is deemed satisfied by
certain minimum contacts because a person or corporation that conducts "activities
within a state ... enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state." Id. at
319. Obligations, if any, that may arise out of their activities within the state can
"hardly be said to be undue." Id. at 319.
18 Id. at 319. This minimum contacts test "is not susceptible of mechanical ap-
plication; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed ...." Kulko v. Superior Ct. of
Cal., 436 U.S. 84,92 (1978).
"Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). "This 'purposeful availment' re-
quirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a
result of 'random,' fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts....or of the 'unilateral activity
of another party or a third person.'" Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
475 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984);
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984)). A court may also consider choice of law provisions
in a contract when determining whether defendant invoked the "benefits and pro-
tections" of a state's laws. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 481 (criticizing Court of Ap-
peals for giving insufficient weight to choice of law provisions).
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state's courts." The Supreme Court has stated that mere fore-
seeability,21 or putting an item into the stream of commerce, are
not alone dispositive.22 Instead, something more is required,
such as determining whether the cause of action arose from the
defendant's activities within the forum state.23
Finally, to ensure that "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" are satisfied, a court will consider factors
20 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; see also Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97-
98; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
21 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295 (stating that " 'foreseeability'
alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due
Process Clause"). "If foreseeability were the criterion, a local California tire retailer
could be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout occurs there .... " Id. at
296. " '[Tlhe foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the de-
fendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court there.' " Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (stating that "[tihe placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward
the forum State"). Additionally, the defendant's awareness that his product may or
will be swept into the forum state in the stream of commerce does not convert the
act into one that is "purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id. But see
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116-17 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that jurisdiction based
upon "mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce is consistent with
the Due Process Clause" so long as defendant is aware that his product is being
marketed in forum state). It appears that the circuit courts have struggled over
whether to adopt the approach from World-Wide Volkswagen or from Asahi. In
Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth
Circuit decided to adopt the approach from World-Wide Volkswagen. See Irving, 864
F.2d at 386. The Irving court, after noting that Asahi was a plurality opinion, stated
that "[b]ecause the Court's splintered view of minimum contacts in Asahi provides
no clear guidance in this issue, we continue to gauge [defendant's] contacts with [the
state] by the stream of commerce standard as described in World-Wide
Volkswagen." Id. The court in Irving further held that a Yugoslavian company which
sold asbestos to an American broker, which in turn sold it to another company ex-
posing it to plaintiff, was subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas because the
Yugoslavian company "reasonably should have anticipated being haled into a Texas
court given its contacts with that forum." Id. The First Circuit, in Benitez-Allende v.
Alcan Aluminio Do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1988), adopted the rule of the
plurality in Asahi by holding that placement of a product into the stream of com-
merce, with additional conduct by defendant, was sufficient to vest the court with
jurisdiction. See Benitez-Allende, 857 F.2d at 29-30.
23 When a suit does not arise out to the defendant's contacts with the forum,
"general jurisdiction" must be established. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 n.15;
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9. To establish "general jurisdiction" over a defen-
dant, the defendant's contacts with the state must be continuous and systematic.
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16. In contrast, when a suit does arise out of the
defendant's contacts with the forum, the court is said to be exercising "specific ju-
risdiction" over the defendant. Id. at 414 n.8.
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such as: the "burden on the defendant" in being subjected to the
forum state's jurisdiction;' "the forum state's interest in adjudi-
cating the dispute";' "the plaintiffs interest in obtaining conven-
ient and effective relief';26 "the interstate judicial system's inter-
est in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies";
27
and the forum state's interest in furthering its social policies.28
Thus, personal jurisdiction over a defendant is properly acquired
when both the state's long-arm statute and the constitutional
demands of Due Process are satisfied.29
II. INTERNET AND WEB PAGE CASES
A. E-mail as "Minimum Contacts"
Perhaps the most famous case to date in the area of personal
jurisdiction and the Internet is the Sixth Circuit's decision in
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson."0 Defendant Patterson, a Com-
puServe subscriber, entered into a "Shareware Registration
Agreement"31 with CompuServe, an Internet service provider
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
292). This consideration has perhaps taken on less significance as modem transpor-
tation has made it easier for a defendant to defend in a foreign jurisdiction. McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
292); see also McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (stating that "[i]t cannot be denied that Cali-
fornia has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its resi-
dents when their insurers refuse to pay claims").
23 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
292); see also Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (stating that in-
terests of plaintiff and forum state are not sole interests to be considered).
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
292).
2 Id.; see also Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98 (recognizing that California's interest in
protecting welfare and environment in which its minor children are to be raised is
"unquestionably important").
See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996).
'0 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). For extensive commentary on this case, see Cen-
dali & Arbogast, supra note 4, at C7; William J. Cook, Four Internet Jurisdiction
Cases Break Rule of Thumb, CHICAGO LAW., October 1996, at 76; Joseph J. Ortego,
Contracts, Internet Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 17, 1996, at
1.
3' The CompuServe Shareware Registration Agreement ("SRA") is an online
contract, entered into via computer, between new shareware providers, such as Pat-
terson, and CompuServe. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260-61. Patterson was re-
quired to "type 'AGREE' at various points in the document, '[in recognition of
[their] on line agreement to all the above terms and conditions.' " Id. The court as-
sumed, for its analysis, that the contract was valid. See id. at 1263-64.
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headquartered in Ohio,3" to distribute his software.33  This
agreement incorporated Patterson's preexisting "CompuServe
Service Agreement" which expressly provided that the contract
was entered into and governed by the laws of Ohio.' After three
years, Patterson discovered that CompuServe was marketing a
program similar to his own and notified CompuServe, via e-
mail, 5 that they were infringing upon his common law trade-
marks and were guilty of deceptive acts and practices. 6 Com-
puServe filed for declaratory judgment in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Ohio." Patterson
responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal ju-
risdiction.38 Attached to this motion was a supporting affidavit
which stated that he had never been to Ohio. 9 The District
Court granted Patterson's motion to dismiss and CompuServe
appealed. °
The issue before the Sixth Circuit was whether CompuServe
"Shareware" is "software distributed at no charge and paid for voluntarily at
the time of registration or upon receiving documentation file or more functionality."
Shareware, Freeware, and More, IDAHO STATESMAN, May 23, 1996. A shareware
creator may submit original software to a service provider such as CompuServe,
who will then make it available to all of its subscribers. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at
1260-61. Subscribers wishing to purchase the software receive it through the tele-
phone wire and are expected to submit payment to the service provider. Id. The
service provider sends payment to the "shareware creator" after taking a fee. Id.
CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260. A service provider allows subscribers to access
its server as the Internet. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
CompuServe is considered one of the major service providers in the United States
along with America Online, Microsoft Network, and Prodigy, combining to serve an
estimated 12 million subscribers. Id.
CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1261. Patterson's software was a program to help
other users "navigate" their way around the World Wide Web. Id.
Id. at 1263-64.
E-mail stands for electronic mail and is "comparable in principle to sending a
first class letter ... [it] is not routed through a central control point, [but rather it]
can take many and varying paths to the recipients." ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834; see
also CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1261 n.5 (explaining e-mail).
CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1261. During the three year period, Patterson elec-
tronically transferred 32 "master software files" to CompuServe in Ohio. Id. After
Patterson's notice, CompuServe subsequently changed the name of its program. Id.
3' Id. CompuServe relied on diversity subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). Motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction are made under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides: "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading...
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading ... except that the following defenses
may .. be made by motion: ... (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person ...." Id.
CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1261.
4 id.
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made a prima facie showing4' that Patterson's electronic contacts
with Ohio were sufficient, under the Due Process Clause, to es-
tablish minimum contacts.42 The court noted that CompuServe
was seeking to establish specific personal jurisdiction since the
basis for the action arose out of Patterson's "contact" with Ohio.43
The court applied a three part test to determine whether the ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction would satisfy due process accord-
ing to International Shoe and its progeny." The court first exam-
ined whether the defendant purposefully availed himself of the
privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in
the forum state;4 5 second, whether the cause of action arose from
those acts or consequences; 46 and third, whether the acts or con-
sequences "[had] a substantial enough connection with the forum
to make the exercise of jurisdiction ... reasonable."47
Under the "purposeful availment" inquiry, the court rea-
soned that since Ohio law governed this case, because Patterson
had entered into a written contract with CompuServe with an
express choice of law clause," and since Patterson continued a
three year relationship with CompuServe, during which time he
repeatedly sent them software," Patterson had "purposely
4' Only a prima facie showing by the plaintiff is required before the court holds
an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1262. As a result the district court ruling on a motion
to dismiss must "consider the pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff ..... Id. at 1262. At an evidentiary hearing the plaintiff must establish
jurisdiction by a preponderance of evidence. Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt,
S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990).
4 CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1263. The CompuServe court noted that under the
Ohio long-arm statute, Ohio courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident who transacts business in Ohio to the extent allowed by due process. Id. at
1262.
43 Id. at 1263.
'id.
Id. The court stated that "purposeful availment" is satisfied when contacts
are created by the defendantfs own actions, creating a "substantial connection" with
the forum, and when the contacts are such that he "should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there." Id. at 1263 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 474-75).
46 CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1263.
47 Id.
4The court uses the term "written contract," assuming that it was binding
without actual signatures. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1264; See also supra notes
31-36 and accompanying text (detailing agreement between Patterson and CompuS-
erve). For a discussion on validity of "point and click" and similar contracts, see
Cendali & Arbogast, supra note 4, at Cl.4" CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1265. The court stated that "Patterson deliberately
set in motion an ongoing marketing relationship with CompuServe, and he should
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availed himself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio." ° The
court also determined that the cause of action arose out of the
defendant's activities in Ohio since any common law trademark
claim Patterson might have had was created in Ohio. 1 Addi-
tionally, Patterson's e-mail demands to CompuServe in Ohio
helped give rise to the suit." On the basis of these factors and
after consideration of the burdens placed on Patterson," the in-
terests of Ohio,54 and the interests of CompuServe,55 the court
concluded that assertion of personal jurisdiction was reason-
able."
B. Personal Jurisdiction Cases Involving Web Pages as
"Minimum Contacts"
1. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.
Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.57 involved a
trademark infringement suit brought in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Connecticut.58 Unlike CompuServe,
the defendant's contacts with the forum state consisted solely of
its Web page; e-mail was not involved. 9 The plaintiff, Inset Sys-
tems, was a Connecticut corporation and the defendant, Instruc-
tion Set, was a Massachusetts corporation. ° Each corporation
have reasonably foreseen that doing so would have consequences in Ohio." Id.
50 Id. at 1266.
"' Id. at 1267 (observing that because Patterson sold and marketed his software
exclusively on CompuServe's system, his common law trademark was created in
Ohio).
52 Id. ("Thus, Patterson's threats-which were contacts with Ohio--gave rise to
the case before us .... ").
5' CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268 (emphasizing that although it may be burden-
some, Patterson knew upon entering agreement that he was "making a connection
with Ohio," which he hoped would be lucrative).
Id. (deeming Ohio's interests substantial because action would involve Ohio
company and Ohio law). The forum state's interest is a factor that must be taken
into account. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
"' CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267 (finding CompuServe's interests were substan-
tial because at least $10 million was at stake). This consideration is part of the
analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson. See 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
'6 CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268-69.
67 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
58 Id. at 162.
-9 See id. at 162-63 (stating that defendant neither employed employees in state
nor conducted business in state on regular basis).
'0 Id. at 162.
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had its principal place of business in its respective state of incor-
poration 1 and the defendant maintained no offices or employees
in Connecticut, nor conducted regular business there.62 In 1985,
the plaintiff registered for and received ownership of the federal
trademark "INSET."' Thereafter, the defendant began using
"'INSET.COM' as its Internet domain address" " and "1-800-US-
INSET" as its telephone number.65 The plaintiff brought an ac-
tion alleging infringement of its federal trademark and various
violations of state unfair competition law, requesting damages
and injunctive relief." The defendant moved to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction.17
The district court addressed the jurisdictional issue by in-
quiring into whether the defendant's conduct satisfied Connecti-
cut's long-arm statute' and the minimum contacts requirement
6 Id. at 162.
'2See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 162-63.
6 Id. at 163.
"Id. Domain addresses are similar to street addresses, in that it is through a
domain address that Internet users find one another. A domain address consists of
three parts: the first part identifies the part of the Internet desired such as world
wide web ("www"); the second part is usually the name of the company or other
identifying words; and the third part identifies the type of institution such as gov-
ernment (".gov") or commercial (".com"). Id. Problems typically arise when domain
names or universal resource locations use words similar to a trademark See id. The
Web browser may likely "confuse" the source of the Web page from the owner of the
trademark. See id.; see also Richard K Herrmann, Crossing the Virtual Line on the
Internet, 14 DEL. LAW., Spring 1996, at 6, 8, 16 (citation omitted) (stating that
"domain name is for all practical purposes an address or an indication of presence
on the Internet. It is the 'vanity tags of all vanity tags,' for it indicates a global exis-
tence").
Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
"Id. at 162. The trademark action was brought under the Federal Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127. Id. The alleged state actions included unfair competi-
tion and injury to business reputation. See id.
67See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 162 (basing motion on FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2)). Al-
ternatively, the defendant also alleged improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3). Id.
6Connecticut's long-arm statute provides that:
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident
of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in this state,
whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted
business in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in inter-
state or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows: (1) Out
of any contract made in this state or to be performed in this state; or (2)
out of any business solicited in this state by mail or otherwise if the corpo-
ration has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers
relating thereto were accepted within or without the state ....
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411(c) (West 1996) (This section was repealed on Janu-
ary 1, 1997 pursuant to 1994, P.H. 94-186, § 214).
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of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.69 The
court, in denying the motion to dismiss,70 first analogized the
facts of the case to two advertising cases previously decided by
the court.71 The Inset court reasoned that the defendant, by the
very nature of the Web,72 "ha[d] been continuously advertising"7
Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
70 Id. at 163 (reiterating test set forth in Lombard Bros. Inc. v. General Asset
Mgmt. Co., 460 A.2d 481, 483-84 (Conn. 1983)). The test set forth in Lombard re-
quires an inquiry into the authorization jurisdiction under the long-arm statute and
then to sufficiency under due process. See Lombard, 460 A.2d at 484; see also Ben-
smiller v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 47 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting, un-
der Connecticut law, that determination of whether court has personal jurisdiction
over foreign corporation requires both long-arm and due process analysis); Hill v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 598 A.2d 1107, 1109-11 (Conn. 1991) (denying motion to dismiss
because long-arm statute reached defendant and there was no violation of due proc-
ess).
7' See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163-64 (discussing McFaddin v. National Executive
Search, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Conn. 1973); Whelen Eng'g Co. v. Tomar Elecs.,
Inc., 672 F. Supp. 659 (D. Conn. 1987)). The court in Inset indicated that McFaddin
stood for the proposition that Connecticut's long-arm statute was satisfied when de-
fendant placed advertisements for its franchises in newspapers appearing in Con-
necticut over a six month period. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164. The court in Inset failed
to point out, however, that the defendant in McFaddin "maintained general busi-
ness connections with Connecticut" by having a franchisee located within Connecti-
cut and having had negotiated part of the contract being sued upon in Connecticut.
See McFaddin, 354 F. Supp. at 1170. The McFaddin court then concluded that all of
the defendant's activities in Connecticut were "relevant in assessing minimum con-
tacts." Id. (citing Michael Schiavone & Sons v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 263 F.
Supp. 261, 263 (D. Conn. 1967)).
Similarly, Whelen involved a defendant who consistently advertised within
Connecticut, but in addition, sold its products in Connecticut. See Whelen, 672 F.
Supp. at 661. Due to the independent basis for the extension of minimum contacts in
Whelen and McFaddin, the Inset court's reliance on these cases seems misplaced. Cf
Powell v. Sealectro, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D. Conn. 1962) (stating that mere solici-
tation of business is not sufficient to satisfy due process). But see Traveler's Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950) (holding that long-arm jurisdictional ba-
sis relying on mail solicitation for insurance certification satisfied minimum con-
tacts requirement).
72 The Inset court reasoned that because advertisements on the World Wide
Web could be accessed repeatedly by the 10,000 users in Connecticut and were in
electronic form, they could be accessed by a greater number of potential customers
than traditional print advertising. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164; see also Edias Soft-
ware Intl, L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 419-20 (D. Ariz. 1996) (using
accessibility of web page as part of minimum contacts analysis).
73 Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164; see Hagar v. Zaidman, 797 F. Supp. 132, 136 (D.
Conn. 1992) (stating that "[a] foreign corporation is subject to suit under
[Connecticut's long-arm statute] for causes of action that arise from business solic-
ited in Connecticut if the solicitation has been repeated"); cf Lombard, 460 A.2d at
487 (holding that placement of advertisement by defendant in two out of state
newspapers, which would likely enter forum state, did not constitute repeated solici-
tation).
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in Connecticut and therefore had solicited in a "sufficient[ly] re-
petitive nature to satisfy ... Connecticut['s] long-arm statute."74
The court then addressed the issue of minimum contacts by
first inquiring into whether the defendant "reasonably antici-
pat[ed] being haled into court" in Connecticut75 and, second by
determining whether "maintenance of the suit in the forum state
... offend[ed] traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."76 The court held that due process was satisfied because the
defendant reasonably could have anticipated being haled into
court in Connecticut since it had "purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of doing business within Connecticut" through its
Web page.77 Further, the court reasoned that maintenance of the
suit did not offend traditional "notions of fair play and substan-
74 Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164.
75 Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)); see Thomason v. Chemical Bank, 661 A.2d 595, 603 (Conn. 1995) (stating
that "[a] plaintiff need only demonstrate that the defendant could reasonably have
anticipated being haled into court here by some person who had been solicited in
Connecticut and that the plaintiffs cause of action is not materially different from
an action that might have resulted directly from that solicitation") (emphasis omit-
ted); Frazer v. McGowan, 502 A.2d 905, 908 (Conn. 1986) (stating that section 33-
411(c) is "consistent with the constitutional demands of due process, it is the totality
of the defendant's conduct and connection with this state that must be considered,
on a case by case basis, to determine whether the defendant could reasonably have
anticipated being haled into court here") (citation omitted); see also In re Connecti-
cut Asbestos Litig., 677 F. Supp. 70, 76 (D. Conn. 1986) (noting that defendant's rea-
sonable expectation of being haled into state court if its products caused injury was
sufficient to satisfy minimum contacts).
76 Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165. In reaching this conclusion the court compared the
facts in Inset to Whelen Engineering Co. v. Tomar Electronics, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 659
(D. Conn. 1987). Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164. The court in Whelen found that the de-
fendant had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the fo-
rum state where it had advertised and had "provided products on order." Whelen,
672 F. Supp. at 664. The court in Inset reached the same conclusion upon finding
that the defendant, like the defendant in Whelen, had made its advertisements
available continuously to any interested person. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165. The
court in Inset did not address the fact that its defendant, unlike the defendant in
Whelen, had not sold any products in Connecticut. Compare Bross Util. Serv. Corp.
v. Aboubshait, 489 F. Supp. 1366, 1371-72 (D. Conn. 1980) (stating that "[tihe
transmission of communications between an out-of-state defendant and a plaintiff
within the jurisdiction does not, by itself, constitute the transaction of business in
the forum state"), affd, 646 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1980), with Hagar, 797 F. Supp. at 136
(stating that "[wjhile there is no precise test for invoking [Connecticut's long-arm
statute], when a foreign corporation places advertisements in a newspaper whose
circulation includes Connecticut, that is sufficient to invoke [the long-arm statute]").
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tial justice,"78 because the defendant resided near Connecticut
and the state had an interest in adjudicating the dispute. 9
2. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.
A similar conclusion was reached by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in Maritz, Inc. v.
Cybergold, Inc.8° Maritz involved a trademark infringement suit
brought by Maritz, a Missouri corporation, against Cybergold, a
California corporation.81 Cybergold moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction,82 claiming its only contact with Missouri
was its Web page, which provided information regarding Cyber-
gold's mailing list service.' Maritz countered that the Web page
acted as a "state-wide advertisement" soliciting Missouri resi-
dents to put their names on the mailing list." The district court
conducted a two part inquiry analyzing both Missouri's long-arm
statute" and the satisfaction of due process. 8' After concluding
78 See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165; see also International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
'9 Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant was less
than two hours away and had retained counsel within Connecticut. Id. The state
had an interest in adjudicating the dispute because the action concerned issues of
Connecticut law. Id. The court mentioned all five considerations to be analyzed un-
der Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, but addressed only two of them. Id.; see supra
note 24-29 and accompanying text (detailing five Burger King factors).
8 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
8' Id. at 1329. The action was based on a violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1) which provides in part that:
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services ... uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device ... which (A) is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, con-
nection, or association of such person with another person ... shall be liable
in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1996). The Lanham Act provides federal causes of action for
intellectual property infringement. See Barnes Group Inc. v. Connell Ltd. Partner-
ship, 793 F. Supp. 1277, 1303 (D. Del. 1992). This includes infringement by Internet
use. See Edias Software Intl v. Basis Intl, 947 F. Supp. 413,420-21 (D. Ariz. 1996).
Plaintiff sought an expedited hearing for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
defendant from using "Cybergold" in connection with its planned Internet Service.
Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1329.
" See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1328; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) (listing lack
of personal jurisdiction among defenses).
83 Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330. This mailing list would presumably include
many Internet users who were residents of Missouri. Id.
Id.
8' Missouri's long-arm statute provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any person or firm, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, or any
corporation, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts enu-
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that the defendants' activities satisfied the "commission of a tor-
tious act" provision of the Missouri long-arm statute,7 the court
then applied a five part due process test to determine whether
Cybergold had minimum contacts with the forum state.8
Under its due process analysis, the court considered: "(1) the
nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the
quantity of those contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action
to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a
forum for its residents; [and] (5) the convenience of the parties."8
The court reasoned that because Cybergold "consciously decided
to transmit advertising information to all Internet users, " o and
merated in this section, thereby submits such person, firm, or corporation,
and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of
such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this state ...
(3) The commission of a tortious act within this state....
MO. ANN. STAT. § 506.500 (West 1949 & Supp. 1997).
8' See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1329. The two step inquiry is required when de-
ciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., CPC-Rexcell,
Inc. v. La Corona Foods, Inc., 912 F.2d 241, 243 (8th Cir. 1990); Nollman v. Arm-
strong World Indus., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (E.D. Mo. 1985); In re Estate of
Halverton, 840 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); M & D Enters., Inc. v. H.C.
Fournie, 600 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1331. Consequently, the court found it unnecessary to
determine whether the defendant's contacts satisfied the "transaction of any busi-
ness" provision of the long-arm statute. Id. The court also stated that "a violation of
the Lanham Act [is] tortious in nature," and compared Maritz to two tort cases, Pe-
abody Holding Co. v. Costain Group PLC, 808 F. Supp. 1425, 1433-34 (E.D. Mo.
1992) and May Dep't Stores Co. v. Wilansky, 900 F. Supp. 1154, 1159-60 (E.D. Mo.
1995), that permitted jurisdiction. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1331-32. The court con-
cluded that jurisdiction was proper "because the allegedly infringing activities have
produced an effect in Missouri ... [causing] Maritz economic injury." Id. at 1331; see
also Dotzler v. Perot, 899 F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (noting that statute al-
lows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident tortfeasor who com-
mits extraterritorial tortious acts which have consequences within state); Schwartz
& Assoc. v. Elite Line, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1366, 1369 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (same); cf State
ex rel William Ranni Assoc., Inc. v. Hartenbach, 742 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Mo. 1987)
(noting that "[because someone in Missouri conceivably could suffer a financial loss
as a result of... out-of state activities does not make Ranni amenable to the courts of
this state").
3 Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1332. This test was articulated in Land-O-Nod Co. v.
Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1983). Accord Aaron
Ferer & Sons Co. v. Diversified Metals Corp., 564 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1977).
c' Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1332.
Id. at 1333. The court rejected Cybergold's contention that its activities were
passive by analogizing the defendant's activities to a situation in which an inter-
ested party mailed the defendant a request for information. Id. In that situation,
Cybergold would have to actively mail back the information. Id. It is submitted that
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its contacts were "of such a quality and nature, albeit a very new
quality and nature for personal jurisdiction jurisprudence,"91 the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant was war-
ranted.92 Specifically, the "quantity of the contacts" factor was
deemed satisfied because Cybergold's Web page had been ac-
cessed by Missouri residents 131 times.93 Furthermore, since the
alleged injuries arose out of Cybergold's Web page, the cause of
action was deemed related to the contacts.94 After comparing
this case to Inset, the court further concluded that Cybergold had
"purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business"
within Missouri, and that "traditional notions of 'fair play and
substantial justice'" were satisfied.95
3. A Different Result in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King
A similar scenario was presented to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, in Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King.6 In Bensusan, the court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction97
solely on the basis of its interpretation of New York's long-arm
the court overlooked the subtle distinction that unless an Internet users accesses
Cybergold's Web page, an act over which Cybergold has no control, no information
will ever be transferred. It takes an affirmative act by another party, the Internet
user, to cause the information to be transferred to Missouri. This conflicts with Bur-
ger King where the Court held that a defendant should not be haled into a jurisdic-
tion based upon the "unilateral activity of another party or third person." Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales
de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984)); see also Breiner Equip. Co. v.
Dynaquip, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 204, 206 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (stating that "[nleither use of
the mails, telephone calls, nor unilateral activities on the part of the plaintiff ... is
enough to subject a defendant to service of process in Missouri").
" Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333.
92 Id.
' Id. The court disregarded the 180 times that the plaintiff accessed Cyber-
gold's websito because [if such contacts were to be considered, a plaintiff could al-
ways try to create personal jurisdiction." Id. at 1333 n.4.
SId.
95 Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1334, see notes 57-79 and accompanying text
(discussing Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn.
1996)). After stating the considerations set forth in Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477,
the court concluded that Missouri had an interest in resolving the dispute because it
involved an alleged infringement of a Missouri corporation's trademark, the plaintiff
had a strong interest in adjudicating in issouri, and the defendant had not shown
a significant burden. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1334.
937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
9' See id. at 298 (noting that defendant moved for dismissal under FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(2)).
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statute.98 Bensusan, a New York corporation and owner of a fed-
erally registered trademark, "The Blue Note," brought an action
against King, an owner of a Missouri club called "The Blue
Note."9 King's alleged infringement was the posting of a Web
page"' containing general information, a calendar of events, and
ticket information for his Club in Missouri, plus a logo allegedly
similar to Bensusan's. 0 Bensusan asserted that personal juris-
diction existed under New York's long-arm statute.1 2
New York's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over a de-
fendant who "commits a tortious act within the state"' or who
"commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to per-
son or property within the state."4  The court began by noting
" Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 297. New York's long-arm statute, Civil Practice
Law and Rules section 302(a) provides:
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this sec-
tion, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary ...
who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to
supply goods or services in the state...
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of ac-
tion for defamation of character arising from the act...
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation
of character arising from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have conse-
quences in the state and derives substantial revenue from inter-
state or international commerce ....
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 1990). For a discussion of New York's long-arm
statute, see DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEWYORK PRACTICE §§ 84-94 (2d ed. 1991).
9 Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 297. Bensusan brought the action for trademark
infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition. Id. at 298.
"o' The Web page was located on a computer server in Missouri. Id. at 297.
1o, Id.
'02 Id. at 298; see supra note 98 (setting forth relevant provisions of N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 302(a)).
'03 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) (McKinney 1990). This provision has been narrowly
construed. See Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d
443 (1965) (dismissing action in Feathers v. Lucas for lack of jurisdiction under
302(a)(2) by holding that although plaintiffs were injured in New York, where stor-
age tank exploded, the situs of tortious act, negligence, was in Kansas, where stor-
age tank was manufactured). This narrow interpretation prompted the enactment of
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3). See SIEGEL, supra note 98, § 87, at 134.
14 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1990). The plaintiff must also show that
the defendant's actions satisfied the requirements under subparagraph (i) or (ii) of
C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3). See supra note 98.
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that trademark infringement occurs "where the deceived cus-
tomer buys the defendant's product""5 and that an "offering for
sale of even one copy of an infi-inging product in New York, even
if no sale results, is sufficient to vest a court with jurisdiction
over the alleged infringer. "16 The court concluded that the tor-
tious act was without the state, however, because a New Yorker
purchasing tickets for King's club would have to pick them up in
Missouri, thereby placing the situs of the tort in Missouri and
not New York. 
0 7
Likewise, in analyzing the long-arm provision for tortious
acts occurring outside the state, 10 8 the court determined that the
conditions for jurisdiction were not satisfied. 109 The court found
that King did not derive substantial revenue from interstate
commerce," King could not have foreseen consequences in New
York,"' and finally, that Bensusan had not suffered loss in New
York."2 Accordingly, because the Bensusan court found jurisdic-
tion to be improper under New York's long-arm statute, there-
fore, the court did not have to entertain the question of whether
the assertion of personal jurisdiction would have satisfied due
process."' Nevertheless, the court noted in dictum that
105 Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299 (quoting Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton
Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1956).
'o' Id. (citing Editorial Musical Latino Americana, S.A. v. Mar Intl Records, Inc.
829 F. Supp. 62, 64-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); German Educ. Television Network, Ltd. v.
Oregon Pub. Broad. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1529, 1532 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Hertz Sys., Inc. v.
Hervis Corp., 549 F. Supp. 796, 797-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Honda Assocs., Inc. v. No-
zawa Trading Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
117 Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299 (noting that affirmative effort to market prod-
uct is entirely distinct from supplying accessible information).
'08 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1990).
'09 See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299-300 (analyzing requirements set forth in
C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii)).
110 See id. at 300 (concluding that King's participation in interstate commerce by
hiring bands of national stature was not equivalent to deriving substantial revenue
from interstate commerce).
... Id. (citation omitted) (noting King's knowledge of location of Bensusan's club
was not sufficient to satisfy requirement that defendant " 'expects or should rea-
sonably expect the act to have consequences in the state' ").
"2 See id. (citations omitted) (stating that indirect financial loss of injured party
residing in New York does not satisfy statutory requirement of" 'significant eco-
nomic injury' ").
11 See id. It should be noted that section N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) must be
read in conjunction with the due process requirements set forth in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980), and subsequent cases,
which significantly curtail the broad language found in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3). Due
process requires that a nonresident defendant "purposefully avail" itself of the
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"asserting personal jurisdiction over King in this forum would
have violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Con-
stitution." 4
III. INTERNET CASES YIELD ALARMING RESULTS
A review of the four cases discussed above highlights the
difficult issues encountered by courts in Internet jurisdiction
cases."5 It is submitted that the CompuServe court had less dif-
ficulty finding jurisdiction because the contacts with the forum
state were more significant than the mere existence of a Web
page."'6 Principally, there also existed intentional communica-
tion and contact with CompuServe, a chosen entity in a known
jurisdiction." ' Thus, the main factual difference between Com-
puServe and the other cases is that Patterson, instead of signing
a contract and mailing his software, used e-mail to effectuate a
communication."8 In the future, it is likely that courts will treat
e-mail in the same manner that they currently treat telephone
calls, mail, and faxes when assessing a defendant's minimum
benefits and privileges of the forum state so that it should "reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there." See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). In addition, where
personal jurisdiction is at issue, the defendant's due process rights should be the
court's primary concern. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982). See generally SIEGEL, supra note 98,
§ 88, at 135-40 (discussing cautious posture of Supreme Court in unintentional tort
cases).
" Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300. The court stated that:
King has done nothing to purposefully avail himself of the benefits of New
York. King, like numerous others, simply created a Web site and permitted
anyone who could find it to access it. Creating a site, like placing a product
into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide--or even worldwide-
but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum
state.
Id. at 301.
s See Zembek, supra note 13, at 348 (stating that "courts will struggle with
novel cyberspace jurisdictional issues because cyberspace communications turn the
notion of territorial sovereignty on its head"); see also Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,
947 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating that "comparison of the mainte-
nance of a website to the active solicitation through mass mailings is to some extent
unsatisfactory").
". See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1996)(stating that Patterson entered into a Shareware Registration Agreement with
CompuServe and then "electronically transmitted" 32 master software files to Com-
puServe" over a three year period).
11 Id. at 1260 (noting that agreement between Patterson and CompuServe ex-
pressly stated it was entered into in Ohio).
"a See id. at 1261 n.5 (describing "e-mail").
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contacts with a forum state."' Such treatment is reasonable be-
cause using e-mail is, in essence, just another affirmative mode
of communicating and thereby transacting business." In this
respect, the assertion of jurisdiction based on e-mail presents
less problems than the facts encountered in the other three cases
and, therefore, is beyond the scope of this Note."
In contrast to CompuServe are the Inset and Maritz deci-
sions. In both cases, the courts simply concluded that a com-
mercial Web page, by its very nature, "solicits" business within
the state sufficient to satisfy the long-arm statute. These two
courts essentially established that a Web page was the equiva-
lent to "advertising" which was directed at the state. Neither
court conducted an in-depth inquiry as to whether any of the fo-
rum's residents had actually accessed the defendant's Web
page... or judged the quality of any such contacts.' Thus, hav-
ing concluded that contacts existed, it was easy for the courts to
find that due process was satisfied. It is submitted that both the
Inset and Maritz cases present frightening prospects for the fu-
19 See Cendali & Arbogast, supra note 4, at C9. Courts have been open to
treating e-mail like other forms of communication to such an extent that "e-mail
service of process was allowed last spring by a London Court." Wendy R. Leibowitz,
Geography Isn't Destiny, High Tech is Reshaping Legal Basics; Bit By Bit, Comput-
ers and the Internet are Changing the Nuts and Bolts of Law, NAV'L L.J., Sept. 23,
1996, at Al.
12 But see Cendali & Arbogast, supra note 4, at C9 (explaining that it may be
more difficult to confer jurisdiction in e-mail cases, rather than regular mail or tele-
phone calls, because e-mail addresses do not indicate location of recipient thus ren-
dering it impossible to prove given defendant "knowingly reaching out to the fo-
rum"); see also JOHN R. LEVINE, THE INTERNET FOR DUMMIES, 28-30 (2d ed. 1995)
(explaining that e-mail addresses consist of merely mailbox name and host name of
recipient's computer system).
1 But see Decision Brings Web Sites More Exposure to Distant Suits, IN-
TERACTWE MARKETING NEWS, Oct. 11, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL
7820203 (stating that Patterson court's "broad reading of jurisdiction ... is troubling
in aplication").
This is significant because it cannot be said that a defendant is soliciting
business through a Web page in a state if that Web page has never been accessed
there. Perhaps the Inset court did not address this issue because it was satisfied
with the fact that there were at least 10,000 potential Internet users in Connecticut
that could have seen the page. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F.
Supp. 161, 163 (D. Conn. 1996). It is submitted that this is unacceptable reasoning
because it is tantamount to the conclusion that anyone who prepares a catalogue,
intended for mailing, has "solicited" business from a state solely due to the fact that
there are 10,000 mailboxes in the state.
m See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3) ("commits a tortious act without the state causing
injury to person or property within the state") (emphasis added).
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ture of conducting business over the World Wide Web. Each
court's interpretation of their respective long-arm statutes and
minimum contacts analysis tends to indicate that both courts
would find personal jurisdiction in most, if not all cases where
the sole contact with the forum state was a Web page.' If both
cases are followed, findings of personal jurisdiction in future
Web page cases appear destined to become the norm.
On a doctrinal level, this is problematic because a primary
goal of International Shoe is to ensure predictability in the legal
system, thereby "allow[ing] potential defendants to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit." 'u By declaring that a Web page, because of its very nature,
seeks to conduct business in every forum, courts applying the
conclusion-based analysis of Inset and Maritz, will prevent de-
fendants from structuring their activity predictably. 6 As ex-
emplified by the Inset and Maritz decisions on the one hand, and
Bensusan on the other, jurisdiction may rest solely on how
broadly a forum's courts decide to interpret its long-arm statute.
On an analytical level, the failure to understand and apply
the unique factual situation presented by Web pages may have
led to a misapplication of due process. When the courts in Inset
and Maritz concluded that the defendants had purposefully
availed themselves of the privilege of doing business within their
respective forum states,' 7 they analytically departed from the
traditional due process requirements. 8  Traditionally, the
'2 See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164 (holding that "advertising via the Internet is
solicitation of a sufficient competitive nature, to satisfy the Connecticut Long-Arm
statute"); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(stating that Cybergold web page established contacts necessary for personal juris-
diction to be exercised).
' World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Such
predictability is desirable because it provides an opportunity to allow a
"purposefuflly availing" defendant to "alleviate risk of burdensome litigation by pro-
curing insurance" or allocate costs to consumers. See id.
But see Ortego, supra note 30, at 1 (noting that "[blusinesses can still struc-
ture their operations with at least some minimum assurance as to where they may
be liable to suit" after CompuServe). It is suggested that this statement can no
longer be made following the decisions in Inset and Maritz.
See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164-65; Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330-34.
' See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985) (instructing
that "purposeful availment" exists when defendant has "engaged in significant ac-
tivities within a state, or has created 'continuing obligations' between himself and
residents of the forum") (citations omitted). The Supreme Court in Burger King also
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"purposeful availment" requirement for personal jurisdiction
calls for "significant activities," 9 a "substantial connection,"3 ' or
the defendant's creation of "continuing obligations" with resi-
dents of the forum,131 such that the defendant is "shielded by 'the
benefits and protections' of the forum's laws." 2 It is this shield
that gives rise to reciprocal obligations which might include re-
sponding to a suit brought against a defendant in the forum
state.13 It is submitted that in both Inset and Maritz there were
no "significant activities," "substantial connections," or estab-
lishment of "continuing obligations," but instead only a "passive"
Web page." It is further opined that a closer examination of the
factual situations-setting up a Web page and simply posting it
to a server-does not reveal the existence of "significant activity"
within a forum so as to create the reciprocal obligations required
stated that actions by the defendant must "create a 'substantial connection' with the
forum State." Id. at 475 (citation omitted). For an overview of relevant jurispru-
dence, see William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 599 (1993).
"2 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76 (stating that where defendants have de-
liberately engaged in significant activities within forum, they have purposefully
availed themselves of forum state); see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (stating that selling and distributing substantial number of
copies of publication within any state is substantial activity subjecting defendant to
personal jurisdiction); cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (stating that
to be subject to personal jurisdiction, each defendant must purposefully avail itself
"of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state").
'3 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (holding that jurisdiction is proper where de-
fendants' activities create "substantial connection" with forum state); McGee v. In-
ternational Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (same); cf Kulko v. Superior Ct. of
Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 97 (1978) (rejecting personal jurisdiction as there was "virtually
no connection with the forum state").
'3' See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76; see also Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781
(implying that regular sale and distribution of magazines in forum state creates
continuing obligations); McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (finding that delivery of insurance
contracts and mailing of premiums to forum state created continuing obligation);
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950) (holding that insurance
contracts "systematically and widely delivered" into forum state created continuing
obligations in forum state).
112 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; see also International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (stating that "to the extent that a corporation exercises
the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and pro-
tection of the laws of that state").
'3 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. Both
cases suggest that the privileges provided to a defendant who purposefully avails
itself the forum state make it fair and reasonable that such defendant "submit to
the burdens of litigation in that forum as well." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
1-4 See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1996);
Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Conn. 1996).
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to satisfy due process.
It is suggested that the reasoning employed by the Inset and
Maritz courts, allowing them to conclude that the mere posting
of a Web page satisfied due process, may be irresistible to states
seeking to expand their long-arm jurisdiction. For example,
while the defendant in Maritz did not conduct activities in Mis-
souri beyond those performed in connection with any other
state,135 the non-state specific jurisdictional analysis exercised by
that court can now be considered and relied upon by all other
courts in similar suits. Thus, the reasoning used in Maritz could
be applied to reach the unacceptable and seemingly unfair result
that a corporation, e.g., Cybergold, could be subjected to juris-
diction in all fifty states merely by posting a Web page on the In-
ternet.136 This result seems to violate the very essence of the Due
Process Clause. 37 It is asserted, therefore, that the Inset and
Maritz courts erred by failing to conduct the in-depth analysis
mandated by the traditional due process tests in order to deter-
mine whether there was a violation. Accordingly, it is suggested
that the Inset and Maritz courts, by minimizing minimum con-
tacts, interpreted their long-arm statutes beyond the limits of
due process.
IV. MINIMUM CONTACTS SHOULD NOT BE MINIMIZED
The concepts of due process and minimum contacts required
for personal jurisdiction should not be eroded simply because
business can be conducted more easily and efficiently on a na-
See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1331.
'8 See Matthew R. Burnstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in
Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 88 (1996) (stating that
"[b]ecause material is accessible universally, jurisdiction might lie almost any-
where").
'3 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Courts have long held, as stated in International
Shoe, that a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction may not violate the
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" in order to comply with due
process. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316; Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). Contemporary courts also adhere to these standards of due
process before subjecting a defendant to personal jurisdiction. See Burnham v. Su-
perior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 609-10 (1990) (relying on "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice" standard). The Court in International Shoe also stated
that satisfaction of due process depends upon "the quality and nature of the ac-
tivit[ies]" of a defendant in a forum state such that the defendant "enjoys the bene-
fits and protection of the laws of that state." International Shoe, 326 U.S at 319. The
defendant's enjoyment of these benefits and protections gives rise to a reciprocal
obligation of defending a lawsuit in the forum state. See id.
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tional level than it could fifteen years ago."' The Due Process
Clause was intended to protect the liberty interests of individu-
als and to guarantee "fair and orderly administration of the
laws."139 Due process is satisfied in the context of jurisdiction by
protecting individuals from "the binding judgments of a forum
with which [the individual] has established no meaningful
'contacts, ties, or relations.' "140 Thus, due process requires that
defendants be given "fair warning that a particular activity may
subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign" in order
to guarantee their protection.' "[Tihis 'fair warning' require-
ment is satisfied if the defendant has 'purposefully directed' [its]
activities at residents of the forum."' Accordingly, insistence
upon "fair warning" before jurisdiction will vest, establishes a
degree of predictability and allows defendants to structure their
activity in such a way that they will know in advance, with a
reasonable degree of certainty, where they will and will not be
subject to suit.43 Both Inset and Maritz not only upset this pre-
dictability, but also ignore the other requirements necessary to
satisfy due process.
First, from the standpoint of predictability, both decisions
have the potential to be very disruptive. It has been generally
settled that advertising on a national level does not alone confer
sufficient minimum contacts to vest a court with general juris-
diction'" and the posting of a Web page for commercial purposes
"" See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). The
Court in World-Wide Volkswagen explained that "the eventual demise of all restric-
tions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts" was not warranted merely because
interstate commerce and the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents had increased
and modern transportation made litigation in distant places less burdensome and
more feasible. Id. (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
"9 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
"0 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Inter-
national Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319) (emphasis added); see also supra note 136 (noting
that any state may have jurisdiction because of universal accessibility to World
Wide Web).
141 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (alteration in original) (quoting Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)). This warning requirement
provides the legal system with a degree of predictability and defendants with dis-
cretion in structuring their activities. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472.
" Id. (emphasis added) (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
774 (1984)).
'43 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
297).
144 See Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Kootenai Elec. Coop., 17 F.3d 1302,
1305 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that "mere placement of advertisements in nationally
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seems to be equivalent to national advertising, given its reach
across the country and the world. Both courts disagreed, how-
ever, finding that Web pages differ from national advertising.14
It is asserted that the facts demonstrate the contrary. Unlike
mail solicitations, or other forms of direct advertising, which re-
quire the individual or corporation to actively direct or aim ma-
terials into a particular state, creating and posting a Web page
does not involve any directing or aiming.46 Web pages are
merely stored on a server computer and remain there until ac-
cessed.147 The fact that they can be accessed at any time only
distributed papers or journals does not rise to the level of purposeful contact with a
forum required by the Constitution"); Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927
F.2d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[b]y itself... national advertising that
reaches the forum state is not always sufficient to establish minimum contacts").
But see Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440, 447 (10th
Cir. 1985) (indicating that if advertisement is related to cause of action, jurisdiction
may be properly taken).
14 See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-33 (E.D. Mo.
1996) (recognizing similarities between Web sites and national advertising, but
noting that speed and reach of Web sites create more differences than similarities);
Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996)
(stating that while similarities between Web sites and national advertising do exist,
diverse capabilities of Web sites create key difference).
Some argue, however, that conventional advertising cases present closely
analogous factual situations to advertisements found on the Internet. See, e.g.,
Zembek, supra note 13, at 368-70 (using hypothetical to explain that solicitation to
sell computer program posted on "newsgroup" resembles nationwide advertisement
distributed in all fifty states, and that any contract for sale entered into is contract
created by mere unilateral activity of buyer). In fact, courts have recently held that
national advertising campaigns involving the Internet did not involve systematic
and continuous contact with the forum sufficient for personal jurisdiction. See IDS
Life Ins. Co. v. Sunamerica, Inc., 1997 WL 7286, at * 8 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
.. See id. (stating that having Internet site, even with other forms of adver-
tisement, is insufficient evidence that defendant directed any advertisements di-
rectly to forum state). An analogy can be drawn between Web cases and cases that
have analyzed placing a product into the "stream of commerce." See, e.g., Asahi
Metal Indust. Co., v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opin-
ion) (suggesting that "[tihe placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State"); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984) (holding that authors of libel-
ous article distributed in one state could be subject to suit in plaintiffs forum be-
cause they aimed their actions intentionally toward forum state and knew that
brunt of injury would be felt there); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (rejecting plaintiffs contention that there was jurisdiction by
stating that " 'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for per-
sonal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause"). It is asserted, therefore, that
posting a Web page resembles placing an advertisement into the "stream of media"
because the Web page, like the advertisement, may be accessed everywhere, or no-
where.
147 See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 927-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that Web
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changes their availability, but does not transform them into a
targeted activity. For example, a local pizza parlor in New York
should hardly be viewed as aiming its activities at California, or
any other state, merely by posting a Web page which can be ac-
cessed outside of New York. Finding otherwise would not only
render the Due Process Clause meaningless in jurisdictional
analyses, but in all likelihood would severely curtail the World
Wide Web as a viable business tool. Thus, the distinction be-
tween Web pages and national advertisements should not be
enlarged unnecessarily, by simply concluding that when one
posts a Web page, one is directing the Web page all over the
country and therefore subjecting themselves to personal juris-
diction in all fifty states. The possibility of being subjected to
nationwide jurisdiction by merely posting a Web page would
eliminate the predictability"8 that guides an individual in struc-
turing his or her conduct;"4 9 a protection the Due Process Clause
is intended to provide.
The Due Process Clause further requires that there be fore-
seeability such that a defendant should "reasonably anticipate
being haled into court" in a foreign jurisdiction.5 ' "[Tihere
pages are stored on servers and are accessed when one selects "lin" to that page).
An individual who posts a Web page thus has no control over who accesses their
Web pages nor in what jurisdiction this access takes place. This situation differs
from what occurs in a closed system like WESTLAW or LEXIS-NEXIS. In these
types of systems, the system's owner has direct control who will have access to their
system of information by distributing their software and individualized passwords.
WESTLAW can determine where each one of its users resides and from where they
access the system. WESTLAW can also block particular databases from certain us-
ers if and when they so choose. Those who post material on the World Wide Web
and Usenet Newsgroups (bulletin boards), however, do not currently possess the
technology to prevent individuals in certain forums from access.
' See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (discussing fact
that fair warning generates predictability, which is beneficial to defendant); World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (addressing benefits of predictability). Arguably,
however, a degree of predictability would still exist if a Web page did in fact confer
jurisdiction because then the defendant could "predict" with certainty that by post-
ing such a page, it would be liable to suit in all fifty states. This argument carries
little merit because it virtually robs the word "predictability" of its meaning.
'49 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (stating that benefit of predictability repre-
sents ability of defendant to structure its activities). The argument that the defen-
dant can still structure its conduct by simply not using the World Wide Web is un-
acceptable and unreasonable from a policy stand point. Use of the World Wide Web
for business purposes should be encouraged, not chilled, in order for the United
States to compete in a global market.
1 50 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
297). It is the "defendant[s'] conduct and connection" with the forum that causes
them to reasonably anticipate being haled into court. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474.
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[must] be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws"15' in
order for a defendant to "reasonably anticipate" litigation in a
foreign jurisdiction. It is submitted that this requirement cannot
be met where the sole contact with the forum state is a Web
page. First, the posting of Web pages can hardly be viewed as
"conducting activities" within a forum.'52 Although posting a
Web page indicates a desire to have Internet users visit the site,
there is generally no expectation that a resident of a particular
. Id. at 475 (emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958)). The benefit and protection derived by the defendant from conducting activi-
ties within the forum state gives rise to the reciprocal obligation of responding to
litigation regarding disputes arising out of those activities in that state. Burger
King, 471 at 476.
12 See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. It has been held that the application of the rule
that unilateral activity of residents of the forum state with nonresident defendants
cannot satisfy the contact requirement varies according to the "quality and nature"
of the defendant's activity. Id. However, it is required that a defendant
"purposefully avail itself ... of conducting activities within the forum state." Id. In
International Shoe, the Court held that the criteria used to determine whether ac-
tivities justify subjection of a defendant to litigation are not "simply mechanical or
quantitative." International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. The test for such activities is not
whether the activity that the defendant has conducted through its agents in other
states is "a little more or a little less." Id. Instead, "the quality and nature of the ac-
tivity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insureP must be examined. Id.
The Court in International Shoe examined whether the activities conducted by
the defendant were irregular or casual, but found instead that they were
"systematic and continuous" and "resulted in a large volume of interstate business."
Id. at 320. The Court held that personal jurisdiction in the forum state was proper.
Id. In Hanson, the Court held that there was no personal jurisdiction since there
was no evidence that the defendant performed any acts in the forum state. Hanson,
357 U.S. at 251. Similarly, in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court held that because
the defendant "close[d] no sales and performe[d] no services ... solicited no business
there either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to
reach the State" personal jurisdiction was improper. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 295. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court also stated that basing jurisdiction
on "one, isolated occurrence" would violate due process. Id. The Court in McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co. held that there were sufficient activities within the
forum state to make personal jurisdiction proper because the contract for insurance
was delivered in California, premiums were mailed from there and the insured re-
sided in California upon death. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
223 (1957).
It is asserted that these criteria for conducting activities are not satisfied by
merely posting a Web page on the Internet which can reach many assessors without
the poster controlling who is reached. Individuals who post Web pages do not con-
duct activities within particular states and are not "continually and systematically"
conducting business. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
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state will actually do so. Only when a meaningful exchange oc-
curs between the Internet browser and the owner of the Web
page can there be activity. Second, one does not derive
"significant benefits and protections" from the other forum sim-
ply by virtue of the posting. This can only occur when there is
some meaningful exchange between the business and a con-
sumer. The sole act of consumers visiting the sight would be
equally insufficient if no business activity occurred. Thus, in the
absence of any benefits or protections, no reciprocal obligation to
respond to a suit should arise.153
Finally, the vesting of personal jurisdiction requires
"purposeful availment." This condition cannot be satisfied by
the "unilateral activity of another party or a third person,"155 but
1' See id. at 319, 320. These "benefits and protections" are derived from
"systematic and continuous" activities conducted by a defendant and include the
right to go to that state's courts seeking enforcement of rights. Id. at 320. As a re-
sult of performing activities within a state such defendants then may avail them-
selves of the benefits and privileges of the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 295. In Kulko v. Superior Court of California, the Court held that the defen-
dant did not avail itself of the benefits and privileges of the forum's laws because the
defendant did not benefit directly or seek these benefits for himself. Kulko v. Supe-
rior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978). The Burger King Court stated that reciprocal
obligations should arise only if the defendant receives benefits and protections from
the forum state. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-76.
The activities performed by those defendants who do avail themselves of the
"privileg[es] of conducting business" in the forum state "are shielded by the benefits
and protections of the forum's laws." Id. at 476. Since these defendants are receiving
something from the state it is not unreasonable for them to be required to respond
to a suit against them as a result of their activities in that forum. Id.; see Hanson,
357 U.S. at 253. These benefits and protections require reciprocal obligations on the
part of the availing defendant. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. If these recipro-
cal obligations are connected with the activities the defendant conducts within the
state, responding to a suit brought to enforce these activities is not undue. Id. On
the other hand, it would be unfair to allow a defendant who benefits from a forum
state's privileges and protections to avoid responding to litigation regarding
"obligations that have been voluntarily assumed." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474.
However, these cases should be read to state that if such benefits and protections
are not enjoyed by the defendant then they should have no reciprocal obligations to
the state such as responding to a suit.
"4 See id. at 475 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774
(1984) (stating that " 'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant
will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or
'attenuated' contacts"); see also supra, notes 20, 141-143 and accompanying text
(discussing fair warning component of Due Process Clause).
" Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984)); Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (stating that there
must be some act by which defendant avails itself of benefits of conducting activity
in forum state, not unilateral activity by third person).
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instead requires that the defendant create a "substantial con-
nection" or "continuing obligation," or engage in "significant ac-
tivities" such that the defendant enjoys the benefits and privi-
leges of conducting activities in that forum.15 It is difficult to
conclude that simply posting a passive Web page creates a
"substantial connection" or "continuing obligation" within a par-
ticular forum or constitutes "significant activity."
157
'5 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76 (citations omitted).
157 See id. at 475-76 (stating that "substantial connection" and/or creation of
"continuing obligations" create personal jurisdiction). "Substantial connection" has
been held to exist when an insurance contract was delivered in the forum, its pre-
miums were paid from the forum and the insured resided in the forum when he
died. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. Similarly, in Burger King, the Court held that there
existed substantial connections because the "franchise dispute grew directly out of 'a
contract which had a substantial connection with that State.' " Burger King, 471
U.S. at 479 (emphasis added) (quoting McGee, 355 U.S. at 223). The Court stated
that a contract is "an ordinary but intermediate step serving to tie up prior negotia-
tions with future consequences which themselves are the real object of the business
transaction," Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (quoting Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cul-
len, 318 U.S. 313, 317 (1943)), and therefore created a substantial connection with
the forum. However, there did not exist a substantial connection between the defen-
dant and the forum state in the Kulko case, where the Court held that although a
separation agreement stated that the wife resided in the forum and support pay-
ments should be sent there, it also stated that the wife could move at her will to an-
other state. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93-94. The Court further stated that finding personal
jurisdiction in such a situation "could arbitrarily subject one parent to suit in any
State of the Union where the other parent chose to spend time." Id. at 93. This is
similar to the Web site posters who could arbitrarily be subjected to personal juris-
diction in any state where an accessor may reside. It is asserted, therefore, that
such connections between Web posters and forums are not substantial and should
not subject such posters to jurisdiction in these forums.
"Continuing obligations" are deliberately created by the defendant and exist be-
tween such defendants and the residents of the forum state. Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 476; Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950). In Travelers
Health Association, the Court held that continuing obligations existed between the
defendant and its many certificate holders because the insurance certificates were
"systematically and widely delivered in Virginia." Travelers Health Ass'n, 339 U.S.
at 648. The Court found that the transactions between the defendant and residents
were not "mere isolated or short-lived transactions" but continuously and widely
distributed. Id. Since these obligations were voluntarily created by the defendant
who could have used the Virginia courts to enforce the obligations of the residents,
it follows that the defendant should fulfill its obligations to Virginia by responding
to suits against it. See id. In Keeton, the Court held that regular sales and distribu-
tion of a magazine constituted continuing obligations and proper personal jurisdic-
tion. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781.
It is asserted that such continuing obligations do not exist for Web posters as
they simply place a Web site on the Internet. If users wish to access such sites they
must take affirmative steps to do so. Web sites are not systematically delivered to
residents of a state nor are particular states targeted; access is only possible if a
user desires it.
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It is unfortunate that some courts are reaching conclusions
concerning personal jurisdiction and Web pages that are unfaith-
ful to the requirements of due process. A continued trip down
this path of broad application will serve only to dilute the pro-
tections of due process by making the traditionally required
minimum contacts even more minimal.
CONCLUSION
There is surely one thing about which all must agree: it is
unacceptable for the same factual situation to yield conflicting
and potentially devastating results on an issue affecting all
commercial entities and individuals operating on the World Wide
Web. Assuming that all Web pages are the same,158 the issue of
personal jurisdiction based upon the posting of a Web page is
truly unique. Unlike past activities which necessitated fact de-
pendent inquiries, 59 the answer to all Web page jurisdiction
questions should be the same, either a simple "yes" or "no". As
suggested above, the answers in such cases require consistency
within the constraints of due process. It is submitted that some-
thing more should be required before there is a finding of per-
sonal jurisdiction when the sole "minimum contact" with a forum
state is a Web page. New rules are not necessary provided that
the courts fully appreciate how Web pages operate, and respect
what is actually required by International Shoe and its progeny.
Absent such action, the growth of beneficial and innovative
commercial enterprises over the Internet may be impeded.
Corey B. Ackerman
"' Web pages created for commercial entities are all the same in the sense that
they all contain at least some element of advertising. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruc-
tion Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Conn. 1996) (discussing fact that commercial
Web pages are used for advertising purposes). However, these pages may differ in
the amounts of actual business solicitation they perform. See id. (discussing fact
that business over the Internet varied widely) For example, some Web pages display
products, while others can also list toll free phone numbers for purchase of mer-
chandise or even allow orders to be placed directly through the Web page. See
Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (discussing
different uses of Web sites).
..9 See Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (stating that facts of
each case must be examined to determine whether requisite circumstances exist).
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